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NOTES AND COMMENTS
up to the Congress to erect the signs that are necessary to facilitate
predictable passage through this cross-roads.
71
MARION A. COWELL, JR.
Survey of the United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting
Labor-Management Relations During the 1962-1963 Term*
The labor law decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1962-
1963 term were primarily significant in clarifying perennial labor
issues. The Court was faced with many recurring problems-juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board, federal court pre-
emption, rights under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and a
union's use of dues for political contributions-and it resolutely
drafted new guidelines in an attempt to clarify the existing com-
plexity. But the Court was not entirely relegated to redefining the
old problems as it also was called upon for its initial construction of
recent significant developments such as the agency shop agreement
and superseniority to strike replacements.
The Court took final action on eighty-four labor cases during the
term. Twenty-two of these cases were disposed of by opinion, sixty
were denied review, one was reversed upon grant of review, and one
was remanded with directions to dismiss as moot. The following is
a summary of those twenty-two cases on which the Court granted
review.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE NLRB
The National Labor Relations Board receives its authority from
Congress by way of the National Labor Relations Act.' The power
' For thorough presentations on the problems herein discussed, and many
related problems, see Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C:
Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. CINc. L. Rav. 304 (1959); Kuhn, Liqui-
dation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J. 96 (1962);
MacLean, Problens of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Sub-
chapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. REV. 407 (1958); Schwartz, Rein-
corporation Under The 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. Rv. 159 (1962).
The author acknowledges use of Happer, "The Liquidation-Reincorpora-
tion Problem" (unpublished seminar paper, University of North Carolina
School of Law, May 1963), as an aid in research. The opinions of that
paper do not appear herein except in such case as they coincide with those
of the author.
* The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Professor
Daniel H. Pollitt for the encouragement and guidance given in the prepara-
tion of this paper.
'National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), added by 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as
amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. III, 1962).
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of Congress and thus the NLRB to regulate labor-management re-
lations is limited by the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution. The NLRB, therefore, can regulate labor problems only
in respect to activities and labor disputes which have a substantial
effect on "commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States..."
- The Court determined three "commerce clause" cases during the
term involving the question of the jurisdiction of the NLRB over
the subject matter.
A. Interstate Commerce
In NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.' a New York fuel oil dis-
tributor questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRB over his labor
practices, claiming he was a local distributor and was not engaged
'in interstate commerce. The Board had determined that Reliance
had purchased more than 650,000 dollars worth of fuel oil and re-
lated products from Gulf Oil Corp., an out-of-state supplier who was
concededly engaged in interstate commerce. The Board found that
the activities of Reliance affected interstate commerce within the
meaning of section 2(7) of the National Labor Relations Act8 so
as to give it jurisdiction over the alleged unfair labor practices of the
distributor.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in passing the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act "Congress intended to and did vest in
the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permis-
sible under the Commerce Clause."' In finding that the activities of
Reliance undoubtedly were within the constitutional reach of Con-
gress, the Court pointed to the fact that "Congress has explicitly
regulated not merely transactions or goods in interstate commerce
but activities which in isolation might be deemed to be merely local
but in the interlacings of business across state lines adversely affect
such commerce." 5 The Court found the situation "representative of
many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which
if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to com-
merce."6
2 371 U.S. 224 (1962).
National Labor Relations Act § 2(7), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958).






It is generally agreed that Congress has the power under the com-
merce clause to apply the National Labor Relations Act to the
crews of foreign-flag ships while they are operating in American
waters.7 But in two successful-attacks against the Board's juris-
diction during the term the Court decided that Congress has not
exercised such power.
The Court determined in McCulloch v. Sociedad National de
Marineros de Hondurass that under the Taft-Hartley Act the Board
had no jurisdiction over foreign-flag ships employing foreign crews,
even though the ships were owned by a subsidiary of a United States
corporation. The case arose when the Board ordered an election,
after petition for certification' by the National Maritime Union
(NMU), among the crew of a Honduran vessel to determine whether
or not they wished to be represented by a union.
The Board discovered that an American corporation, United
Fruit Company, owned all the stock of the Honduran corporation,
Empresa, which time-chartered the vessels to United Fruit. It also
determined that all the crew of the vessels, including officers, were
Honduran (except one Jamaican) and claimed that country as their
home; and that the crew was controlled by a collective bargaining
agreement with a Honduran union. United Fruit, however, di-
rected the use of the vessels. The Board concluded that United
Fruit operated a single, integrated maritime operation within which
were the Empresa vessels, reasoning that United Fruit was a joint
employer with Empresa of the seamen covered by NMU's petition.
Using a "balance of contacts" test, it concluded that the maritime
operations involved substantial United States contacts, outweighing
the numerous foreign contacts present, and that the Board had
jurisdiction."0 The Court of Appeals reversed."
In argument before-the Supreme Court the Board attempted to
distinguish a prior case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.1
2
"Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) ; Weldenhus'
Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); The Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116 (1812).
8372 U.S. 10 (1962).
'National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), added by 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as
amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 159(3) (Supp. III, 1962).United Fruit Co. v. National Maritime Union, 134 NLRB 287 (1961).
11300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962).
,353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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In that case the Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not apply
in a suit for damages "resulting from the picketing of a foreign ship
operated entirely by foreign seamen... while the vessel was tem-
porarily in an American port.' 3... [Congress] inescapably de-
scribes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen
of our own country and its possessions." 4 In distinguishing, the
Board urged that unlike the vessel in the Benz case (1) these United
Fruit vessels were not temporarily in United States waters, but were
operating in a regular course of trade between foreign ports and the
United States, and (2) the foreign owner was in turn owned by an
American corporation. 5
The Court voted down the Board's argument and its balance
of contacts test:
We note that both of these points rely on additional American con-
tacts and therefore necessarily presume the validity of the "bal-
ancing of contacts" theory of the Board. But to follow such a
suggested procedure to the ultimate might require that the Board
inquire into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels
calling at American ports. Such activity would raise considerable
disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our inter-
national relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board
orders would project the courts into application of the sanctions
of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a purely ad hoc weighing of
contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrasement in
foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice.' 6
The Court concluded that for it to "sanction the exercise of local
sovereignty under such conditions in this 'delicate field of interna-
tional relations there must be present the affirmative intention of
the Congress clearly expressed,' "'1 and that there is no specific
language in the Taft-Hartley Act or in its legislative history in-
cluding foreign vessels within its coverage.' 8
The Court then applied its Sociedad decision to Incres S. S. Co.
v. IMWU,9 which was granted certiorari with Sociedad. It held that
since the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to foreign-reg-
23 Id. at 139.
1 1 Id. at 144.
2 372 U.S. at 18-19.1  Id. at 19.
171d. at 21-22.
8Id. at 19.
19372 U.S. 24 (1963).
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istered ships employing alien seamen, a state court has jurisdiction
of an action for damages and injunctive relief brought by such a
ship-owner against a United States union for picketing during a
campaign to organize.
The Court reversed the New York court decision2" that the
Labor Board had exclusive jurisdiction. Although it was "arguable"
at the time of the trial court's decision that the Board's jurisdic-
tion extended to this dispute, the decision in Sociedad negated such
jurisdiction now. "The Board's jurisdiction to prevent unfair
labor practices, like its jurisdiction to direct elections, is based upon
circumstances 'affecting commerce,' and we have concluded that
maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen
are not in 'commerce' within the meaning of § 2(6) .... -21
II. STATE LEGISLATION
As indicated by the New York court decision in Incres, one of
the major objectives of the National Labor Relations Act is to
provide an element of uniformity and certainty in the conduct of
labor relations. To this end the United States Supreme Court has
acted to strike down state legislation which attempts to interfere
with the federal law. During the past term the Court heard five
cases which questioned the validity of state statutes in view of their
potential conflict with the national labor policy.
A. Anti-Discrimination Statute
The Court held in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.22 that state laws forbidding racial dis-
crimination in hiring practices may be applied to airlines and other
interstate employers. The Court reversed the Colorado Supreme
Court,23 and commanded affirmance of the Colorado Anti-Discrim-
ination Commission's order that Continental Airlines hire a licensed
and qualified Negro pilot.
The Airline argued that this state law would burden commerce
through conflicting and diverse regulations. The Court answered
Incres S.S. Co. v. IMWU, 10 N.Y.2d 218, 176 N.E.2d 719 (1961).
2'372 U.S. at 27.
, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
23 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962).
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this by pointing out that there was no federal conflict involved in a
state statute forbidding racial discrimination in hiring. It stated
in essence that the threat of diverse and conflicting regulation of a
carrier's hiring practices is virtually nonexistent since any state or
federal law requiring a carrier to practice racial discrimination in
hiring would be invalid as unconstitutional.24
The Airline vigorously argued that the federal law has so per-
vasively covered the field of protecting people in interstate com-
merce from racial discrimination, that the states are barred from
enacting legislation in this field. Justice Black rejected this pre-
emption contention, pointing to the federal law referred to by the
Airline. He made these points:
(1) Althbilgh the Federal Aviation Act contains broad general
provisions against unjust discrimination, neither the Federal Avia-
tion Agency nor the Civil Aeronautics Board have assumed the au-
thority to prohibit racial discrimination by air carriers. There can
be no preemption as long as such power remains dormant and un-
exercised.25
(2) Nothing in the Railway Labor Act places upon the employer
a duty to engage in fair employment practices.
26
-(3) Presidential Executive Orders requiring government contrac-
tors to include non-discriminatory pledges in their contracts cannot
be held to have preempted the field. Even assuming that the Ex-
ecutive Order could foreclose state legislation, "it is impossible for
us to believe that the Executive intended for its order to regulate air
carrier discrimination among employees so pervasively as to preempt
state legislation intended to accomplish the same purpose."27
Thus, the Court's opinion makes it clear that state anti-discrim-
ination laws are not to be regarded as threatening interstate car-
riers with conflicting and diverse regulations which would burden
"commerce, and that such laws are not preempted by federal regula-
tion. The decision permits states to require interstate employers to
adhere to state enacted fair employment practice legislation.
"372 U.S. at 721.
26Id. at 723-24.
'o Id. at 724. The Railway Labor Act applies to airlines as well as to rail-
roads. Railway Labor Act § 201, as amended, 49. Stat. 1189 (1936), 45
U.S.C. § 181 (1958).27 Id. at 725.
[Vol. 42
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B. Public Utility Strike Law.
States cannot require employees to forego the federally guaran-
teed right to strike, even in industries of local importance.2" Thig
position was reiterated this past term when the Court invalidated
Missouri's King-Thompson Act29 in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Missouri.3" The King-Thompson Act authorized the
state to seize struck public utilities and to forbid strikes thereafter. 1
The Governor of Missouri utilized the statute in thwarting a strike
against a Kansas-Missouri transit company.
The Court found the statute unconstitutional under the su-
premacy clause, declaring "
The short of the matter is that Missouri, through the fiction of
"seizure" by the State, has made a peaceful strike against a public
utility unlawful, in direct conflict with federal legislation which
guarantees the right to strike against a public utility, as against
any employer engaged in interstate commerce. In forbidding.a
strike against an employer covered by the National Labor Re-
lations Act, Missouri has forbidden the exercise of rights ex-
plicitly protected by § 7 of that Act. Collective bargaihing', wih'
the right to strike at its core, is the essence of the federal -scheme.32
28 In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 .(1951), the Court held invalid under the Su-
premacy Clause a Wisconsin statute which made it a misdemeanor for any
group of public utility employees to- engage in a strike which would cause
an interruption of an essential public utility service.
Mo. REv. STAT. 295.180 to -.200 (1959).
30374 U.S. 74 (1963).
"Mo. REv. STAT. 295.180 to -.200 (1959). Section 295.180 authorizes
seizure by the state.
Section 295.200(1) provides: '"It shall be unlawful for any person, em-
ployee, or representative as defined in this chapter to call, incite, support or
participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work.for any utility or for
the state after any plant, equipment or facility has been taken over by the state
under this chapter, as means of enforcing any demands against the utility or
against the state."
Section 295.200(6) provides: "The courts of this state shall have power
to enforce by injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision
of this chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor here-
under."
The Taft-Hartley Act excludes from its coverage employees of any state
or political subdivision thereof. National Labor Relations Act §2(2), as
amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958). But in the-instant
case the Court found that the transit company employees did not in, actuality
become employees of the State. No property of the company was actually
conveyed, transferred, or otherwise turned over to the State. The State did
not in any way participate in the management of the company's business.
2 374 U.S. at 82. This right to strike is not unlimited. The Taft-Hartley
Act §§ 206-210, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 176-180 (1958), allows the
19641
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C. Picketing ByNon-Employees
A Virginia statute3 prohibiting picketing by non-employees was
held unconstitutional in Waxman v. Virginia. 4 By a per curiam
order the Court reversed a Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals "
decision which held that neither the Taft-Hartley Act nor the first
amendment prevents the state from prohibiting picketing by non-em-
ployees. The Supreme Court first held to the contrary over twenty-
three years ago in AFL v. Swing.8"
D. Right-To-Work Laws
A union, as a social institution, is dependent for its continued
existence upon its ability to meet the particular needs of its members.
To meet these needs a union must have the strength to obtain rights
for itself as an organization. A usual method of obtaining such
strength is through "union-security agreements" contained in col-
lective bargaining contracts. The "closed-shop agreement" was the
strongest form of union-security. It provided that the employer
could hire only members of a specific union, and that the employer
would discharge any employee who did not remain a member in good
standing throughout the life of the agreement. But this form of
union-security was abolished in 1947 by section 8(a) (3) of the
Taft-Hartley Amendments."
President of the United States to take action, by injunction through a dis-
trict court if necessary, to halt a threatened or actual strike or lock-out affect-
ing an entire industry, or a substantial part of commerce, or which, if per-
mitted to continue will imperil the national health or safety. See, United
Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). See generally, Mc-
Dennott, Ten Years of the National Emergency Procedure, 9 LAB. L.J. 227
(1958) ; Rehmus, Operation of the National Entergency Provisions of Taft-
Hartley, 62 YALE L.j. 1047 (1953).
8 VA. CoDE ANN. § 40-64 (1953): "When a strike or lock-out is in prog-
ress, no person who is not, or immediately prior to the time of the commence-
ment of any strike or lock-out was not, a bona fide employee of the business
or industry being picketed shall participate in any picketing or any picketing
activity with respect to such strike or lock-out."
*'371 U.S. 4 (1962).
"Waxman v. Virginia, 203 Va. 257, 123 S.E.2d 381 (1962).
28312 U.S. 321 (1941).
' National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
as amended, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1962).
Section 8(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment for
the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor organiza-
tion. Union-security clauses necessarily discriminate against non-union em-
ployees and encourage membership in unions. Thus when an employer agrees
.-to a-union-security clause, he would be committing an unfair labor practice
[Vol. 42
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Section 8(a) (3) does permit, under certain conditions, other
forms of union-security agreements. A union and an employer may
make an agreement requiring all employees to join the union in
order to retain their jobs. This is the "union-shop agreement."3'
But the Taft-Hartley Act severely limited the application of union-
shop agreements in section 14(b), which declares that nothing in
the federal statute authorizes the execution or application of union-
security agreements in any state or territory "in which such execu-
tion or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.""9 This
section in effect, has carved out an exception to the preemption doc-
trine for state right-to-work laws.
Another form of "union-security" is the "agency-shop" agree-
ment. Under this arrangement membership in the union is not com-
pulsory, but non-union employees of the bargaining unit are re-
quired to pay support money to defray their share of the bargaining
expenses of the union. The union justifies this because it is re-
quired to bargain for and represent all the employees of the unit
regardless of their union affiliation. In unanimous decisions during
the past term, the Court resolved two much-litigated issues involv-
ing the validity of agency-shop agreements in the face of state right-
to-work laws.
The Indiana right-to-work law4" was the point of departure in
under §8(a)(3). But Congress permitted some union-security agreements
by enacting a proviso which exempts the union-shop from the reaches of
§ 8(a) (3). This exemption, however, does not include the closed-shop con-
tract.
" A lawful union-shop agreement can not require that applicants for em-
ployment be members of the union in order to be hired. The most that can
be required is that all employees in the group covered by the agreement be-
come members of the union within a certain period of time after the contract
takes effect. Membership may be required only after thirty days following
the effective date of the contract or the beginning of the employment, which-
ever is later. The union is also required to admit all eligible employees to
membership without discrimination, although the union reserves the right to
make its own rules of eligibility. The union may seek an employee's dis-
charge for non-membership only when membership has been withdrawn for
failure to tender an initiation fee or periodic dues. If the employer has reason-
able cause to believe that membership was denied or terminated for any other
reason, discharge for membership may be an unfair labor practice on the
part of either the employer or the union, or both, depending on the circum-
stances of the case. See generally, Symposium-Union Security Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 11 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 37 (1959).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61
Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1958).
'" IN. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2701 to -2705 (Supp. 1961). Section 40-2701
19641
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NLRB- v. General Motors Corp.4 The Indiana statute had been
construed by an Indiana Appellate Court in Meade v. Hagberg42 as
permitting agency-shop agreements. That court pointed out that
there are two types of right-to-work statutes in this country- (1)
those which prohibit the compulsory paying of fees to labor organi-
zations, and (2) those which prohibit only the conditioning of em-
ployment on union membership. The Indiana statute is of the latter
type. Since both types of statutes existed prior to the Indiana
statute, the court stated that
it would seem that the clear, unequivocal language of the Indiana
act was intended to apply to union membership and not to out-
law "agency-shop" agreements which provide for the payment of
fees and dues to labor organizations properly designated as collec-
tive bargaining representatives. Had the legislature intended to
make such provisions and such conduct illegal it should have
so expressly declared in the language of the act.
48
After the Meade case was decided, the United Auto Workers
demanded that a General Motors plant in Indiana bargain on the
same type agency-shop agreement as in Meade. General Motors re-
fused to bargain, claiming the agency-shop was an unfair labor prac-
tice under federal law. The union filed a refusal to bargain charge
with the NLRB. The Board found 44 the agency-shop is a lawful
subject of bargaining, but the Court of Appeals reversed.45
provides: "Public Policy. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
the state of Indiana that membership or nonmembership in a labor organiza-
tion should not be made a condition to the right to work or to become an
employee of or to continue in the employment of any employer.., and any
agreements between employers and labor organizations which make mem-
bership or the maintenance thereof, or nonmembership, in a labor organi-
zation a condition of employment or continued employment, and any denial,
severance or interruption of employment because of such membership or non-
membership are violations of said rights and are against the public policy
of the state of Indiana."
Section 40-2703 prohibits any agreement by an employer or a labor organi-
zation to exclude or discharge an employee by reason of membership or non-
membership in a labor organization.
Section 40-2704 prohibits any conduct which encourages exclusion or
discharge of an employee by reason of membership or nonmembership in a
labor organization.
Section 40-2705 declares violations of the provisions of the act shall be
a misdemeanor.
£1373 U.S. 734 (1963).
12 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
'Id. at -, 159 N.E.2d at 414.
"General Motors Corp. v. UAW, 133 NLRB 451 (1961).
': General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 42
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an agency-shop con-
stitutes a permissible form of union-security under the Taft-Hartley
Act. Therefore, the employer was not excused from his duty under
the Act to bargain over an agency-shop proposal.
The Court referred to its language in Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB,4" where it had determined that the legislative history of
section 8(a) (3) indicates that
Congress recognized the validity of unions' concern about free
riders, i.e., employees who receive the benefits of union repre-
sentation but are unwilling to contribute their fair share of fi-
nancial support to such union, and gave unions the power to con-
tract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the
power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason.
47
The Court pointed out that an agency-shop contract is the prac-
tical equivalent of a union-shop contract, since in both the employ-
ment is conditioned on the employee's payment of an amount equal
to the union dues and fees. The Court found that the only sub-
stantial difference between the union-shop and the agency-shop is
that the former puts the option of choice of membership on the em-
.ployer, where the latter places that choice on the employee. "Such
a difference between the union and agency shop may be of great im-
portance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is more formal
than real."4s
In Retail Clerks Int'l Assn v. Schermerhorn,9 the Court found
that since the agency-shop is within the sanction of section 8(a) (3)
as found in General Motors, it is also within the scope of section
14(b). Therefore a state is within its authority under section 14(b)
in invalidating union-shop and agency-shop contracts where such
contracts are contrary to state law. Since Florida, in the instant
case," had held the agency-shop contract invalid under its right-to-
work law,51 the Court dismissed the appeal. But the Court restored
"' 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
11 373 U.S. at 742-43 (1963), quoting from Radio Officer's Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. at 41 (1954).
"Id. at 744.
"373 U.S. 746 (1963).
oRetail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962).
o' FLA. CONST. § 12: "The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union,
or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be construed to
deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization
or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."
1964]
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the case to the calendar for reargument as to whether the Florida
courts, rather than exclusively the NLRB, are tribunals with juris-
diction to enforce the state's prohibition against such arrangements.
5 2
Thus the Court substantially removed many doubts as to the ap-
plication of state right-to-work laws to the agency-shop agreement.
Future agreements can be entered into with more predictability in
following the teachings of these cases:
(1) An agency-shop agreement is not an unfair labor practice, but
rather is a valid form of union-security agreement within section
8(a) (3) of the NLRA.
(2) Since an agency-shop agreement is within section 8(a) (3), it
is also within the preemption exception of section 14(b).
(3) Not all state right-to-work laws prohibit agency-shop agree-
ments, as shown in the construction given the Indiana statute.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Since the Wagner Act in 1935,13 the Court has been called upon
to determine the extent to which state labor regulation must yield
to overriding federal authority. The Court has concerned itself
with the potential conflict between federal and state systems-their
inconsistent standards of substantive law and their differing remedial
schemes. The unifying consideration of the Court's decisions has
been "regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration
of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative
agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its spe-
cialized knowledge and cumulative experience." 5
In Garner v. Teamsters Union,5 the Court explained:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and
application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tri-
bunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation,
complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial
5 On Dec. 3, 1963, the Court held that the state court has jurisdiction to en-
force its state right-to-work law's prohibition against the agency shop clause.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4018 (U.S.
Dec. 3, 1963).
5"National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (now 29 U.S.C.
§ 151) (1958).
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
'346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently
considered that centralized administration of specially designed
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts
likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies.... A multiplicity of tribunals and
a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive
law.5
6
In complying with the congressional intention, the Court has adopted
the doctrine of federal preemption in labor cases.
The principles making up the doctrine of federal preemption
were aptly summarized by the Court in its opinion in San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,57 as follows:
(1) "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,
the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to be averted."58
(2) The initial determination of whether a particular activity is
subject to the Act is exclusively the responsibility of the NLRB.59
(3) The failure of the NLRB to determine the status of the disputed
activity does not necessarily give the state the power to act.60
(4) State regulation is precluded regardless of the remedy sought,
if the conduct to be remedied is potentially subject to the Taft-Hart-
ley Act. The doctrine applies to damage awards as well as to in-
junctions, to state court proceedings as well as to regulation by
state labor agencies, and to actions based on general statutory or
common law as well as to proceedings under a state labor relations
statute.0 1
The Garmon rule was clear and concise. It charted a simple and
direct course of conduct for state courts to follow. It seemingly
performed the invaluable task of warning state judges to stay out
of the field of regulating strikes, boycotts and picketing which comes
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. But the warning has fallen
Id. at 490-91.







on -some. unheeding ears, and the Court decided four cases during
the past term by utilizing the Garmon principles of federal preemp-
tion.
In Local 438, Constr. Union v. 'Curry, 2 a Georgia non-union
contractor brought suit against a union for picketing the construc-
tion site for the .purpose of forcing him to hire only union labor.
He sought - a, temporary injunction, but it was denied without opin-
ion. On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, 3 holding that
,the Georgia Superior Court had jurisdiction to issue the temporary
injunction. On writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court
revrersed, ruling that the picketing involved an arguable violation of
the Taft-Hartley Act and that the NLRB has exclusive primary
jurisdiction. Because of the doctrine - of federal preemption, the
Georgia Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to issue a temporary in-
junction against the picketing. 4
"°371 U.S.- 542 (1963).
Curry v. Construction Union, 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962).
The Court found that the allegations of the complaint, as well as the
findings of the Georgia Supreme Court, made out at least an arguable viola-
tion of § 8(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Georgia court had said the
picketing was for the purpose of forcing respondents to employ only union
labcr and that the picketing therefore violated the Georgia right-to-work
law. On the other hand, the union contended'that its peaceful picketing was
for the sole purpose of publicizing- the facts about the wages paid by the
contractor. In finding preemption applicable, the Court pointed to several
specific provisions which the NLRB may find were violated:
Section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights under § 7 of Taft-Hartley;
Section 8(b) (2) prohibits unions from causing or attempting to cause
discrimination by an employer against an employee;
Section 8(b) (4) (B) prohibits secondary boycotts by unions;
Section 8(b) (7) (C) prohibits organizational and recognitional picket-
ing by non-certified unions unless a representation petition is filed within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement
of such picketing.
In another aspect of the case, the Court was faced with the initial task
of-establishing its own jurisdiction over the controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1958) limits the Court's appellate jurisdidtion to the review of final judg-
ments of state courts, and the state court here had issued only a temporary
injunction. The Court decided it could review because the judgment con-
stfituted a final and erroneous assertion of jurisdiction by a state court be-
yond its power and in the face of a substantial claim that its jurisdiction
is preempted by federal law.
In support of its decision to take jurisdiction, the Court said that a tem-
porary injunction effectively may dispose of the union's rights and render
illusory its right to review as well as its right to a hearing before the NLRB.
The Court continued, "the policy... against fragmenting and prolonging
litigation and against piecemeal reviews of state court judgments does not
[Vol. 42
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In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden6 5 a union
member sought damages in a state court against his union for re-
fusal to refer him to a job upon request by the employer. The mem-
ber alleged that the union had discriminatorily interfered with his
right to contract, and had breached a promise implied in the union
contract not to discriminate unfairly. The union asserted that Borden
had violated an internal union rule prohibiting solicitation of work,
and therefore was not eligible for referral. The state court found for
Borden. 6 The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of the Garmon
rule.
[I]n the absence of an overriding state interest such as that in-
volved in the maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in cases in which the activity that is the subject mat-
ter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protections of § 7
or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.
This relinquishment of state jurisdiction... is essential 'if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted,'
... and is as necessary in a suit for damages as in a suit seeking
equitable relief.
67
The Court asserted that the conduct here was subject to NLRB
cognizance. "[I]t is certainly 'arguable' that the union's conduct
violated § 8(b) (1) (A) .. . and 8(b) (2)"6 in refusing to refer
prohibit our holding the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court to be a
final judgment, particularly when postponing review would seriously erode
the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondent's cause
to be heard by the National Labor Relations Board, not by the state courts."
371 U.S. at 550.
The Georgia Court had already resolved the merits of the issues raised
in the course of the hearing upon the temporary injunction. The petitioner
admitted that there were no further factual or legal issues to be solved by
the Georgia trial court. "Since there was nothing more of substance to be
decided in the trial court, the judgment below was final within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 .... " 371 U.S. at 551.
The decision is significant in providing for a "speeding-up" of the time-
consuming process of appealing a picketing injunction through the state
courts and then to the Supreme Court. It will no longer be necessary to
wait until a permanent injunction is issued; the appeal may be taken on the
temporary injunction.
°373 U.S. 690 (1963).
"Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 355 S.W.2d 729
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
07 373 U.S. at 693-94.
" Id. at 694. Section 8(b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to restrain or coerce an employee. in the exercise of his rights
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Borden. "And there is a substantial possibility in this case that
Borden's failure to live up to the internal rule prohibiting the solici-
tation of work from any contractor was precisely the reason why
clearance was denied." 69 Thus the Board may find that the union
conduct was protected concerted activity within section 7. "It is
sufficient for present purposes to find, as we do, that it is reasonably
'arguable' that the matter comes within the Board's jurisdiction.""
In Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko,1 the
plaintiff union member sued in a state court for damages for an
illegal conspiracy which led to his being discharged. Perko had
worked as a foreman and superintendent and was suspended for
violating a union rule, and was thereafter laid off by the company at
the union's insistence. The Court held that the subject matter of
the action was arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB to deal
with unfair labor practices, and that the state court had no jurisdic-
tion over the controversy.
[I]t may well be that a union's insistence on discharge of a
supervisor for failure to comply with union rules would violate
§ 8(b) (1) (A) because it would inevitably tend to coerce non-
supervisory employees into observing those rules. If so, it would
surely be within the Board's power under § 10(c) to order the
union to reimburse the supervisor for lost wages.
Moreover, if a union forces an employer to discharge a super-
visor, such conduct may well violate 8(b) (1) (B) because it
coerces the "employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances." 72
In Ex parte George,78 a Texas court issued a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the National Maritime Union and its officers from
peacefully picketing a refinery operated by a subsidiary of an oil
under § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act. (Section 7 gives employees the right to
self-organization, to bargain collectively, to join labor unions, to strike for
better working conditions, and to refrain from activity in behalf of a union.)
Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in regard to
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment for the purpose of en-
couraging or discouraging membership in a labor organization.
0"Id. at 695.
O Id. at 696.
"1373 U.S. 701 (1963).
Id. at 707.
3* 71 VUS, 72 (1962).
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company with which the NMU was engaged in a labor dispute.74
It found the subsidiary had a valid &Ilective bargaining 'agreement
with another union and that the object of-NMU's picketing was to
sectiie the breac!i of the collective bargaining agreement, in violation
of a Texas statute.7 5 When the picketing continued, the NMU
was adjudged in contempt, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed,
ruling that such pickting was -rieither prohibited nor protected by
the Taft-Hartley"Act : '- ..' . .
On certiorari, the Court held that the peaceful picket'ing was 'at
least arguably protected by sectiofi 7 of the NLRA and that the
state court was therefore without jurisdiction Ito issue the injunc-
tion. "In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an
activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling prece-
dent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not. for this Court
to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction."76
IV. SECTION 301 EXCEPTION. TO THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
In Smith v. Evening News, Ass'n,7  the-Court definitely estab-
lished that the preemption doctrine does not apply to suits brought
under section 301 (a) 9f the Taft-Hartley. Act,78, even when, the
action complained of is admittedly an unfair labor practice.
Section 301 (a) was enacted in 1947.to give federal .district courts
jurisdiction over suits for violation of certain.specified types of. col-
lective bargaining contracts. 'It was. thereafter contended that the
state courts were preempted from subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause of that section. The-Court in Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney
7 9
disallowed that argument. It-found that the statute provided only
that suits may be brought in federal district courts, not that they
must be. -The statute did not even suggest that federal jurisdiction
be exclusive.
7 Ex parte George, 163 Tex. 103, 358 S.W2d '590 (1962).
Tax. Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 4 (Vernon 1962).711371 U.S. at 73.'
' 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
7 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 61
Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958): "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as 'defined in- this Act, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship 'of the parties." See gen-
erally Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 614 (1951).
'°368 U.S. 502 (1961).
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The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of the
§ 301 (a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums
for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations.
Moreover, there is explicit evidence that Congress expressly in-
tended not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state
courts.8 0
The Court found that, "instead, Congress deliberately chose to leave
the enforcement of collective agreements to the usual processes of
the law."
81
Then in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co. 2 the
Court established dicta from Dowd Box that the state courts in
section 301 cases must apply the principles of the federal labor law
policy.
In Evening News, a suit was brought under section 301 by a
union member in a Michigan court against his employer, alleging
breach of a collective bargaining agreement in discriminating against
him in favor of non-union employees. Both the trial court and the
Michigan Supreme Court 3 dismissed the action on the theory of
preemption, since the action made out an unfair labor practice and
was arguably within NLRB jurisdiction. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. It consolidated its holdings in Dowd Box and Lucas
Flour that the preemption doctrine is not relevant in section 301 (a)
suits, and the state court is free to apply federal law.
Thus the Court seemed to definitely establish a tort-contract
distinction, leaving the Garmon decision intact as to torts which also
involve unfair labor practices, and excepting contracts so that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in applying
federal substantive law of collective bargaining.
In reaching the decision the Court overruled its decision in
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
8 4
on another point. That case held that section 301 did not apply to
the enforcement of the personal rights of individual union members
by either the unions or the members. The Court in the instant case
determined that this holding was based on the misconception that
section 301 was merely procedural in nature for the benefit of the
8oId. at 508-09.
811 Id. at 513.
RZ369 U.S. 95 (1961).
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1962).8,348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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signatory parties to the collective bargaining contract. The Court
pointed out that Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills" has
long since settled that § 301 has substantive content and that
Congress has directed the courts to formulate and apply federal
law to suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts....
Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration
machinery, are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union
interests and many times precipitate grave questions concerning
the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining
contract on which they are based. To exclude these claims from
the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of hav-
ing the administration of collective bargaining contracts accom-
plished under a uniform body of federal substantive law.
6
A subsequent case during the term reiterated the Evening News
decision that section 301 (a) gives jurisdiction to enforce individual
employee rights. In General Drivers Union v. Riss & Co. 7 the
Court held that section 301 (a) gives a United States District Court
jurisdiction to enforce a final and binding grievance procedure award
requiring reinstatement of discharged employees with full back pay
and seniority to the time of reinstatement, as long as the award is
the parties' chosen instrument for the definitive settlement of griev-
ances under the collective bargaining agreement.
V. CO-ORDINATION OF LABOR POLICY
WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Just as the Supreme Court has concerned itself with the doctrine
of federal preemption in order to eliminate the frustration of the
purposes of federal labor legislation, it has been cognizant of the
problems of co-ordinating government agencies so as to best achieve
the Congressional purposes. This problem was before the Court
in two cases during the term.
In Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United
States,"8 the conflict was between the federal labor policy and the
anti-trust laws. Section 6 of the Clayton Act8" specifically exempts
labor organizations from the reach of the anti-trust laws, and sec-
S353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8' 371 U.S. at 199-200.
87372 U.S. 517 (1962).
88371 U.S. 94 (1962).
89 Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
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tion 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act9 ° prevents federal courts from
entering injunctions in "labor disputes."
Here, "grease-peddlers" purchased grease from restaurants, ho-
tels, etc., and sold it to processors. The grease-peddlers were mere
middlemen in the transaction and made their living from the profit
margin on the resale. Four of the grease-peddlers joined the Team-
ster local to fix prices at a higher profit margin. The union agents
enforced the prices by threatening the exercise of union economic
power in the form of strikes and boycotts against any processor
who dealt with non-union grease-peddlers. The Justice Department
brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act.0 The district
court found92 there was a violation of the anti-trust law, enjoined
such further action, and in addition directed the termination of the
grease-peddlers' union membership. The union appealed the termi-
nation order. a
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that businessmen who
combine in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sher-
man Act can not immunize themselves from that sanction by calling
themselves a labor union. The Court could not find any job or
wage competition or economic relationship justifying the grease-
peddlers' membership in the union. Rather, the Court found they
were organized into the union solely to enable them to use the union
as an enforcer of a cartel to fix the price and allocate the market.
The case did not involve a labor dispute, but involved an "illegal
combination between businessmen and a union to restrain trade. '94
Mr. Justice Douglas dissentedf 5 He felt there was a labor dis-
pute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that
therefore the federal court had no power to compel the grease-ped-
dlers to terminate their union membership. Moreover, in Allen
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 4Z Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
"Sherman Act § 1, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), amending
26 Stat. 209 (1890). "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust
br otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade' or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal..."
2 U.S. v. Los. Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union, 196 F. Supp.
12 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
"8 In anti-trust cases where the United States is the complainant, 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1958) requires a direct appeal from the district court to the
Supreme Court.
9"371 U.S. at 102.
9 Id. at 108.
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Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW9 6 the Court held that a union's com-
bination with business interests in order to violate the antitrust laws
could be enjoined only as respect to those prohibited activities.
Otherwise the injunction would directly counter to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. According to Justice Douglas, "when we sanction
the addition of the penalty of expulsion from union membership, we
qualify the Allen Bradley decision."
'97
In Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States" the Court
considered the overlapping functions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the NLRB. Several non-union intrastate motor
carriers in Nebraska were involved in a labor dispute with a union.
The union tried to put pressure on the intrastate carriers by boy-
cotting the traffic of unionized interstate carriers to and from Ne-
braska. The intrastate, carriers formed a corporation and applied
to the ICC for a permit to act as an interstate motor carrier. The ICC
granted the authority on the basis that the union- boycott had re-
sulted in inadequate service to a large section of the public. The
Commission made no findings to justify the choice of this remedy
instead of other forms of relief under other sections of the Act.
Several interstate carriers sought review on the basis that the new
corporation would divert traffic from them. The district court sus-
tained9 9 the ICC order as within its scope of authority, although in
the interim between the ICC order and the District Court decision
Congress had passed the LMRDA10 0 which raised serious questions
as to the validity of such union-induced boycotts. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, judgment reversed and re-
manded to set aside the Commission's order, and to remand the
case to the ICC for further proceedings. The ICC should be par-
ticularly careful in its choice of remedy because of the possible
effect of its decision on the functioning of the national labor rela-
tions policy.
The Commission acts in a most delicate area here, because what-
ever it does affirmatively (whether it grants a certificate or enters
a cease-and-desist order) may have important consequences upon
"' 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
97371 U.S. at 113.
- 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
"Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Ill. 1961).
"' Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III, 1962), amending 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
'19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the collective bargaining processes between the union and the
employer. The policies of the Interstate Commerce Act and the
labor act necessarily must be accommodated, one to the other.1 1
VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As usual the Court was called upon to construe the unfair labor
practice provisions of the Act to novel or unique situations.
A. Super-seniority to Strike Replacements
The National Labor Relations Act specifically provides that
employees have a right to strike. Section 7 states in part, "Em-
ployees shall have the right.., to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection."'1 2 Strikes are among the concerted activities pro-
tected for employees by the section. Section 13 provides, "nothing
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications
on that right."'
03
The strike is a legitimate economic weapon when used within
the limitations and qualifications prescribed in the NLRA. Section
2(3)'04 of the Act protects the strikers, preserving their status as
employees while they are striking for economic reasons and provid-
ing that they may not be discharged. But as a protection for the
employer the Court decided in 1938 in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co.' 5 that an employer may hire replacements during an eco-
nomic strike in order to continue his business, and he need not, at
the end of the strike, discharge the replacements to reinstate the
returning strikers. During this term the Court was called upon to
determine whether the right of replacement in Mackay carries with
it a right to adopt a super-seniority policy that would assure the
replacements some form of tenure.
201371 U.S. at 172.
10" National Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
20' National Labor Relations Act § 13, as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
"°' National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).
100304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,10 Local 613 of the Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers struck in
support of new contract demands after the expiration of the old con-
tract. All 478 unit employees participated in the strike. The com-
pany continued minor production by the use of clerks, engineers and
non-unit personnel. The employer began hiring permanent replace-
ments for the strikers after a month had passed, assuring the re-
placements they would be retained after the strike ended. The com-
pany notified the union that it intended to give the replacements some
form of super-seniority. It then announced that replacements and
strikers who returned to work would be given twenty years addi-
tional seniority for layoff purposes. Within two weeks the number
of strikers returning to work caused the union to give up the strike.
With the strike ended, the company reinstated all the strikers whose
jobs had not been filled. But layoffs soon followed and the em-
ployees laid off were largely reinstated strikers whose seniority could
not match the super-seniority granted to others. The NLRB de-
termined that a super-seniority offer to strike replacements and to
economic strikers who abandon the strike was discriminatory and
destructive of the strike.'0° The Court of Appeals reversed... on
the basis that the right of an employer to replace economic strikers
carries with it the right to adopt a seniority policy, provided that
the policy is adopted solely to protect and continue the business.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and affirmed the NLRB decision, holding that an employer's grant
of super-seniority to replacements for economic strikers and to em-
ployees who abandon the strike is so inherently discriminatory and
destructive of union activity as to violate the Taft-Hartley Act
without regard to the employer's motivation.
The Court pronounced that "super-seniority by its very terms
operates to discriminate between strikers and nonstrikers, both dur-
ing and after a strike, and its destructive impact upon the strike and
union activity cannot be doubted."' 0 9 In reaching this decision the
Court affirmed the Board's finding that super-seniority has the fol-
lowing effects and characteristics:
.0. 373 U.S. 221 (1962).
1oI Erie Resistor Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 132
NLRB 621 (1961).
18 Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1962).
100 373 U.S. at 231.
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(1) it affects the tenure of all strikers, whereas permanent replace-
ment affects only those who actually are replaced;
(2) it necessarily operates to the detriment of those who partici-
pated in the strike as compared with nonstrikers;
(3) if made available to bargaining-unit employees, as well as new
employees, it offers individual benefits to the strikers to induce them
to abandon the strike, thus dealing a crippling blow to the strike
efforts;
(4) it renders future bargaining difficult, if not impossible, for the
collective bargaining representative;
(5) it is in effect offering individual benefits to the strikers to
abandon the strike." 0
The business purpose the employer seeks to serve in ending the
strike is outweighed, in the view of the Supreme Court and the
Board, by the harmful effects a policy of super-seniority has on
union rights. "Under § 8(a) (3) it is unlawful for an employer by
discrimination in terms of employment to discourage membership
in any labor organization, which includes discouraging participation
in concerted activities such as a legitimate strike.""' Thus, a grant
of super-seniority during a strike is violative of section 8(a) (3)
without regard to the motivation of the employer.
B. Refusal to Bargain About Agency Shop
In NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,1 2 discussed earlier, the
Court determined that an employer's refusal to bargain with a
certified union over the union's proposal for the adoption of an
agency shop is an unfair labor practice.
Section 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act"' makes it illegal for
an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith about wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment with the representative selected
by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining. However, the employer is not required to bargain over a
proposal that he commit an unfair labor practice.
In the instant case, General Motors refused to bargain over the
agency shop proposal on the grounds that the agency shop was an
'OId. at 230.
111 Id. at 233.
112 373 U.S. 734 (1963). See also note 38 supra and accompanying text.
11 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
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unfair labor practice within section 8(a) (3) of the Act. The Court
decided that an agency shop was a lawful subject of bargaining, and
therefore General Motors committed an unfair labor practice in
refusing to bargain over the proposal.
VII. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The policy of collective bargaining by employees through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing received its initial peacetime Con-
gressional encouragement in the Railway Labor Act in 1926."" The
Act encouraged the making of agreements relating to all working
conditions for railroad employees, and recognized that both'the
carriers and their employees have the right to choose their own bar-
gaining representatives.115 A board of mediation was established to
facilitate settlement of disputes between the representatives."
6
The success of the Act led the movement toward the adoption of
federal labor legislation for all industry affecting interstate com-
merce. Because of its special problems, however, the Railway Labor
Act has remained separate from the general labor acts. During the
past term the Court heard two Railway Labor Act cases which were
of particular import to the entire labor field."'
... Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (now 45 U.S.C. § 151 .(1958)).
... Railway Labor Act §2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (now 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1958)).
... Railway Labor Act §4, 44 Stat. 579 (1926) (now 45. U.S.C. § 155
(1958)).
.., The Court also heard two labor cases which involved the application
of specialized sections of the Railway Labor Act. In Brotherhood of Lodo-
motive Eng'r v. Louisville & N.R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963), the Court held
that an employee's right under the Railway Labor Act to bring a federal
district court suit for enforcement of a National Railroad Adjustment Board's
"time lost" award deprived his union of the right to strike to compel pay-
ment of the award by the employer. The Court found that the Act provided
a mandatory and exclusive procedure which does not permit either parfy to
resort to economic self-help at any stage.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682
(1962), the Court ruled that federal district courts have jurisdiction over a
non-diversity suit brought by an airline union to enforce an arbitration award
of an airline system board of adjustment created pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act by the union and the airline. The Court held that such a suit is a
suit arising under the laws of the United States (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337)
(1958), so as to give jurisdiction to federal courts. Section 204 of the Rail-
way Labor Act, which requires carriers and unions to establish system
boards of adjustment, makes contracts providing for such adjustment boards
federal contracts that are governed and enforced by federal law in federal
courts.
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A. Work Rules Dispute
The Court sent the long-standing work-rules dispute between the
railroads and the operating brotherhoods back to the bargaining
tables in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r v. Baltimore & O.R.R."5
This dispute was formally initiated on November 2, 1959, when the
railroads served on the brotherhoods notices of intended changes in
work-rules, rates of pay, and working conditions in order to elim-
inate alleged featherbedding and anti-productivity factors. The dis-
pute raged on without success through National Conferences, a
Presidential Railroad Commission, and the National Mediation
Board. Finally, after the union refused to arbitrate under the Rail-
way Labor Act, the railroads put into effect their rules changes.
The union sought an injunction against the change, but it was denied
in the district court' 9 and in the court of appeals. 2 ' The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that both parties have exhausted all the
statutory procedures, and are relegated to self-help in the adjusting
of the dispute, subject only to the invocation of the President's
power to appoint an emergency board to avert a threatened strike.' 2 '
The decision, despite the headlines it created, seems significant
only as a minor victory for the right of management to exercise its
own prerogatives in dispute areas when resort to bargaining fails
and the procedural requirements of the Act are exhausted.
B. Union Political Contributions
In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen 22 the Court was called
upon to construe a North Carolina decision in the light of the recent
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street 23 decision. The North
Carolina Supreme Court had affirmed,12 4 by an equal division of the
1.8 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
119 Unreported decision.
"0 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 310 F.2d
503 (7th Cir. 1962).
121 Railway Labor Act § 10, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1958) : "If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not ad-
justed under the foregoing provisions of this chapter, and should, in the
judgment of the Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt inter-
state commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of
essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the Presi-
dent, who may thereupon in his discretion, create a board to investigate and
report respecting such a dispute."
12373 U.S. 113 (1963).
1. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).




court, a Superior Court injunction relieving dissenting employees
of all obligations to pay union dues exacted under union-shop con-
tracts where the union used part of the dues for political purposes
to which the employees objected.
The Supreme Court reversed. It announced that according
to Street a union has no power to use an employee's dues, over his
objections, to support political causes which he opposes. But the
injunction here was found improper in relieving the employees of
all obligations to pay the moneys due under the contract. The in-
junction "sweeps too broadly... and might well interfere with the
union's performance of those functions and duties which the Railway
Labor Act places upon them to attain its goal of stability in the in-
dustry."'
1 25
In compliance with the Street rule, the Court remanded the case
for the determination of the following factors: (1) What expendi-
tures disclosed by the record are political? (2) What percentage of
total union expenditures are political expenditures ?126
The objecting employee is entitled to restitution of the moneys
"exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total ex-
penditures made for such political activities to the union's total
budget... 2 7 In determining such proportion, the Court deter-
mined that "basic considerations of fairness" compel that the union
bear the burden of proof since they possess the facts and records
from which it may be calculated. 28
The Court thought it "appropriate to suggest, in addition, a
practical decree to which each respondent proving his right to
relief would be entitled. Such a decree would order (1) [a pro-
portionate refund] ... and (2) a reduction of future such exactions
from him by the same proportion. ' ' 12O But the Court, recognizing
that such proportions may in actuality vary from time to time, en-
couraged unions to
consider the adoption ... of some voluntary plan by which dis-
senters would be afforded an internal union remedy.... if a
union agreed upon a formula for ascertaining the proportion of
political expenditures in its budget, and made available a simple
25 373 U.S. at 120.
120 373 U.S. at 121.
127 Ibid.
12 Id. at 122.
1 Ibid.
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procedure for allowing dissenters to be excused from having to
pay this proportion of money due from them under the union-
shop agreement, prolonged and expensive litigation might well
be averted.
130
The Court then suggested that precedent for such a plan exists
in the Trade Union Act of 1913.131
This decision permits the union to eliminate the so-called "free
rider," i.e., it permits the union by agreement with the employer to
require all employees to join the union and pay dues as a condition
of continued employment; but the decision prevents the union from
using these exacted funds for "political" purposes when the dues
payer objects.
VIII. CONCLUSION
'the problems arising from automation, increasing unemploy-
ment and new legislation have made the law of labor-management
relations increasingly complex. During the past term the Court took
the opportunity to reduce some of this complexity by handing down
clear and concise guidelines in the areas of decision and by placing
more emphasis on the rulings of the National Labor Relations
Board.3 The continuation of such a policy by the Court will
necessarily eventuate in a predictable and more uniform application
of the Taft-Hartley Act to labor-management relations.
WAYNE S. BISHOP
%l0 Id. at 122-23.'
1,- Id. at 123, n.8.
"'It is pertinent to illustrate the agreement between the Court and the
Labor'Board during the term. The Court heard five cases on appeal from
the Board, and affirmed four of these. See 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3037 (U.S.
July 16, 1963). This becomes significant when the entire record of the
Kennedy Labor Board is compared vWith the record of the Eisenhower Board
before practically the same Court. In the 1961-1962 term the Court affirmed
all eight decisions from the first Kennedy Board. See 26 NLRB ANN. REP.
21 (1962). During 1960-1961, the Court reviewed ten decisions from the
Eisenhower Board, affirming only two and modifying one. See 25 NLRB
ANN. RE,. 19 (1961). In the 1959-1960 term, the Court reviewed six Eisen-
hower Board decisions, affirming one and modifying one. See 24 NLRB
ANN. REP. 14 (1960). The record of the Kennedy Board indicates that
there is finally a mutual understanding in the application of the federal labor
policy between the Board and the Supreme Court.
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